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Abstract 
We estimate hazard rates of retirement entry as a function of the option value of work. The 
individuals’ expectations about the future economy are incorporated in the option value of 
work, through which they can impact on the timing of retirement entry. In a scenario where 
individuals expect a strong upturn, the annual hazard rate of retirement entry (average 8.4%) 
is reduced by 6.0% or half a percentage point compared to a scenario where they expect a 
downturn. Had individuals been able to anticipate the Global Financial Crisis, the mere 
expectation of this downturn would have increased retirement entries by 8.7%. 
 
JEL classification: J26, D84, J32 
Keywords: Retirement, expectations, pensions 
 
1 Introduction
In 2006, Australia experienced the height of an extraordinary boom in the mining sector
that resulted in excellent conditions at the labour market as well as the capital markets.
The average rate of return on private pension funds in Australia was near 14% and would
stay there the following year (APRA (2013)). An employed person near retirement age
who had to decide whether to leave the workforce immediately or stay in employment, for
example, for another two years, could increase his total retirement savings by more than
a third when opting for the latter. Two years later in 2008, the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) began to unfold, and although its impact in Australia was less severe than in many
other parts of the world, the situation in the capital markets changed fundamentally. The
average rate of return on private pension funds was -8.1% in 2008 and further shrank to
-11.5% in 2009. An average worker near retirement age facing the same decision as his
colleague did two years earlier, would have lost about a quarter of his retirement savings
by delaying retirement entry by two years. Such a difference in economic circumstances, if
anticipated, should matter to both workers’ decisions. This paper analyses how strongly
such anticipated economic circumstances might impact on individuals retirement deci-
sions.
The GFC hit the world unexpectedly, and thus neither worker could have incorprorated
its impact into his decision making process. Previous analyses of unexpected changes in
retirement wealth due to the development in the capital markets find them to have small
effects on retirement behviour. Coile and Levine (2011) find that the GFC’s impact on
retirement wealth caused only a small delay in retirement entries, and this effect was
more than outweighed by the impact of rising unemployment rates which pushed workers
out of the labour market and into retirement. Their result is supported by Goda et al.
(2012), Hurd et al. (2009) and Coile and Levine (2006). The first paper analyses stock
market data from 2000 to 2008 and does not find a strong relationship between realised
stock market returns and retirement intentions. The latter two papers analyse the stock
market crash of the early 2000s and similarly find no evidence of a substantial impact on
the timing of retirement. However, unexpected shocks on the stock market represent a
sudden change in retirement wealth without any effects on expected pension accruals.
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However, what about conditions in the capital markets that are expected? Distin-
guishing between expected and unexpected capital gains is theoretically important: if
leisure is a normal good, an unexpected increase in retirement savings due to large cap-
ital gains should increase the probability of retirement entry ex post ; at the same time,
expected capital gains should make a worker more likely to delay their retirement entry
ex ante, in order to receive the capital gain in the first place. That is, expected changes in
retirement savings affect not only a worker’s wealth level, but also his expected pension
accruals when delaying retirement entry. Since Stock and Wise (1990) developed their
option value model, numerous empirical studies from many different countries have con-
firmed their basic finding: when one decides about his retirement entry age, the expected
change in retirement income, if retirement entry were to be delayed, is more important
than the current wealth level (See Samwick (1998), Coile and Gruber (2001), and Gruber
and Wise (2004) for a collection of studies from 12 different countries).
The forward-looking nature of the retirement entry decision implies that everyone
forms an expectation about his future income. How strongly do expectations of our per-
sonal future income streams vary - over time and across individuals - with our expectations
about the state of the economy? When calculating option values of work, it is usually
assumed that individuals expect to be able to earn the same income from the labour
market and the capital market in the future, as they do currently. In reality, the foregone
expected income when one decides to retire and start dissaving, instead of accruing and
collecting returns on one’s retirement savings, can vary quite substantially at different
points in time. The risk of job loss varies considerably across the business cycle, and it
has been shown that job displacement has a long-lasting, strong impact on an individual’s
probability of being employed particularly near retirement age (Chan and Stevens (2001),
Davis and von Wachter (2011)). At the same time, rates of return in the capital markets
vary considerably, and are crucial for savings accruals. However, not only do the eco-
nomic conditions change over time but also different individuals at the same point in time
will also form different expectations about the state of the economy for the medium-term
future, as some are more optimistic than others and act on these expectations. Puri and
Robinson (2007) show how an individuals’ level of optimism is indeed related to savings
behaviour, investment choices, and expected retirement entry.
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The simplifying assumption of fixed future income in standard option value models
ignores optimism and pessimism just as it ignores the business cycle. However, how impor-
tant are those differences in expectations? Does it really matter much whether a recession
or a boom period is coming up, or whether an individual is optimistic or pessimistic? This
paper explores the importance of accounting for expectations about the future state of
the economy when modelling the timing of retirement. We study the case of Australia,
where a mandatory savings scheme, which is dominated by defined contributions plans,
implies that the vast majority of workers have retirement savings subject to changes in
the capital markets. Australia is ideally suited to study the impact of those changes,
because its public pension scheme has very small distortionary effects compared to most
other industrialised countries.1 It is thus possible to study the effects of capital markets
on privately funded pension schemes in near isolation from the publicly funded pension
scheme, which ensures that the results can be transferred to other countries’ institutional
framework to the extent that those countries rely on private savings for retirement.
We build on existing studies that apply a reduced-form version of the option value
model as it is applied in Gruber and Wise (2004), in order to model the responsiveness
of older Australian workers to changes in their option value of work. We then assume
that any worker can be either optimistic, neutral or pessimistic in his expectations about
the state of the economy in the next few years. Those expectations about the medium-
term economic future translate into expectations about future rates of return on private
pension funds, and thereby impact on the workers option value of remaining at work.
By simulating retirement entry rates given an individual’s option value based on their
positive or negative expectations about the future, we can map out the possible impact
of economic expectations on the retirement decision.
Had people been able to forecast the impending growth slowdown of the GFC, it would
have led to a 9% increase in exit rates from employment to retirement. This is the first pa-
per of its kind, identifying the statistically and economically significant effect of economic
expectations on the retirement entry decision using nationally representative household
1This is mostly due to the fact that the public pension is low and its receipt not subject to a work
test.
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panel data. Given that the 20 years of unprecedented continual growth have now come
to an end in the aftermath of the GFC, the importance of changing expectations on the
margin is likely to increase for retirement decisions.
2 Institutional background
Australia’s retirement system is two-tiered. The tax-funded, means-tested Age Pension is
designed to ensure a basic living standard and prevent poverty in old-age and is available
for all Australian residents at age 65.2 The age of eligibility was previously 60 years for
women, but has been increased in half-year intervals since 1995, first affecting the birth
cohort of 1935. For the cohorts born on or after 01 January 1949, the age of eligibility is
the same for men and women. Beginning in 2017, the age of eligibility will be increased
further in half-yearly steps until it reaches age 67 for pensioners born on or after 1 January
1957. The maximum payment rate per fortnight is A$842.80 for singles and A$1270.603
for couples, and is increased in line with average wage growth over time.4 The payment
does not depend on past labour market history or current labour market activity, but
is determined by an individual’s or couple’s income. The full pension is paid to singles
(couples) with earnings of up to $156 ($276) per fortnight; if the income exceeds that
threshold, the pension is reduced by $0.50 ($0.25) per dollar of earnings.5
The second pillar of the Australian retirement system is its mandatory savings scheme
’Superannuation Guarantee’ (SG); all employees aged 18 or older who earn at least $450
per month are covered by the SG. Employers pay at least 9% of employees’ wages in an
approved superannuation fund chosen by the employee6. Employers as well as employees
2To qualify for an Age Pension, some other criteria must be met, such as residence in Australia for a
total of ten years.
3All monetary amounts are henceforth expressed in Australian dollars.
4For comparison, the national minimum wage for fulltime employees (38 hours per week) is $1281.80
per fortnight.
5Additional asset tests apply. The maximum allowable amount of assets for receiving a full pension is
$196,750 for singles and $279,000 for couples, excluding the principal home. For couples or singles who
do not own a home, the allowable maximum assets are increased by $142,500. Once those thresholds are
exceeded, the fortnightly pension is reduced by $1.50 per $1,000 of excess assets. The assets test and
income test are applied separately; the smaller of both resulting pension amounts is paid.
6Generally, employees have the right to choose the fund that the employer’s contributions are paid
into, as well as the investment strategy applied by the fund. However, the majority of workers opts for
the fund’s default investment strategy (Gerrans et al. (2010))
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can make additional voluntary contributions. Superannuation contributions are taxed at
a flat-rate of 15%, and thus implicitly tax-subsidised for middle and high-income earners.
For low-income earners, government co-payments for voluntary contributions are avail-
able. In 2012, total assets held in superannuation funds were about $1,400 billion or 92%
of Australia’s GDP; Australia ranks fifth in the OECD in terms of its ‘pension asset-to-
GDP’ ratio and thus well above the OECD average (OECD (2013)). The majority of
assets is held in defined contribution plans ($906 billion) or hybrids of defined contribu-
tion plans and defined benefit plans ($597 billion); pure defined benefit plans are rare and
make up less than 5% of total assets held. Benefit payments during the financial year 2013
totalled $50 billion (APRA (2013)). The high prevalence of defined contribution plans in
combination with the size of the superannuation scheme, in terms of the near universal
coverage as well as the total amount of assets held and benefits paid out, implies that the
performance of superannuation funds has a potentially large impact on older Australians’
retirement entry decisions.
3 Estimation Strategy
We estimate hazard rates of retirement entry for discrete data. A dummy variable denotes
the event in question, i.e. the retirement entry. The dummy variable is set to one at time
t if the person i is not yet observed to be retired in t, but is observed to be retired in
t + 1. The decision to retire is assumed to be irreversible, and indviduals are censored
after a retirement entry was observed. The model is estimated as a simple logit model
with retirement entry as the dependent variable, and a financial incentive measure OVit as
the main explanatory variable. We control for ‘retirement wealth’ Vit, a quadratic in age,
as well as a vector of sociodemographic control variables Xit. Control variables include
the individual’s health, education, home-ownership status, state dummies and a linear
time trend as in (1):
Prob(Yit = 1) = Λ(β0 + β1OVit + β2Vit(t) + β3Ageit + β4Age
2
it + β5Xit.) (1)
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3.1 Constructing the financial incentive measure
The financial incentive measure, the option value of work OVt, is derived from the net
present value of the future utility stream from income and leisure (discounted to the
current period t) which results from retirement at date r: the ‘retirement wealth’ Vt(r).
7
Vt(r) =
r−1∑
s=t
[βs−tEt[Y γs ]pits] +
S∑
s=r
[βs−tEt[kBs(r)γ]pits] (2)
The term Ys denotes labour market income in period s in the periods when the individual
is still participating in the labour market, i.e. from the current period t until the period
immediately before retirement entry, r − 1. The term Bs(r) represents benefits in period
s for those periods when the individual has already retired, i.e. from the period r until
the period of death S. The stream of future retirement income depends on the time of
retirement r. How expectations about the future economic development impact on the
expected future income during retirement, is described in in detail in the following section.
Following Blundell et al. (2004), as would be standard in the literature, the parameter
β is a discount factor set to 0.03; γ is set at 0.75 to account for risk aversion, while k
represents the preference for leisure and is set to 1.5 to reflect that income gained while
not working is more valuable than income gained while working. pits is the probability of
survival until period s in period t. The option value of work OVt is the difference between
the discounted present value of the expected utility stream when entering retirement at
time r∗ (the retirement entry date which maximizes the utility stream) and when entering
retirement immediately at time t, as in:
OVt = Vt(r
∗) − Vt(t) with r∗ = argmax(Vt(r)). (3)
3.2 Medium-term expectations and future income streams
We assume that individuals who are still participating in the labour market receive earn-
ings if they are employed, and draw unemployment benefits if they are not employed.
Expected income before retirement entry, Ys, is the weighted average of the earnings in
period s and the legal unemployment benefits in period s, weighted with the probability
of being employed or unemployed in that same period. We assume that an individual’s
7In what follows, we drop the index i for simplicity.
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unemployment probability u(s) in period s equals the average age-specific unemployment
rate in the years 2001-2011 at the individual’s age in s.
The income after retirement is determined by the retirement savings the individual
has accumulated by the time of retirement. Individuals do not dissave and keep making
contributions to their superannuation accounts while they are still in the labour force. The
superannuation account thus continues to grow by the amount of additional contributions
that are made, and by the returns that are earned on investing that money. The day the
individual retires, superannuation accounts are converted into savings accounts that earn
a secure interest payment iret, which is set to 5.1%.
8 The retiree now begins to withdraw
money from this savings account to provide income during retirement. We assume that
withdrawals are designed to smooth consumption: at the day of retirement entry, the
individual expects to live for a certain number of additional years, and withdraws an
amount equal to an annuity that they could withdraw for the remainder of their expected
life span, when fully dissaving their superannuation account. The following year, they
will update their expected life span, and adjust their withdrawal accordingly.9 Once the
individual’s superannuation wealth falls below a certain level, he will become eligible for
a government age pension to supplement their income.
Et[Bs(r)] = Et[
iret
1 − (1 + (iret)Et[LSs])Et[Ss(r)]] + As(Et[Ss(r)]) (4)
LSs is the further expected life span in period s given the individual has survived until
period s; this expectation is formed in t.10 Ss(r) denotes the individual’s superannuation
wealth in period s, given he retired in period r. As denotes the age pension one is eligible
for in s. The age pension is means tested and thus depends on the superannuation wealth
in the same period.
Superannuation contributions are made and thereby superannuation wealth is accrued
as long as the individual is still working. Before the superannuation is claimed upon retire-
ment entry, he earns returns from the capital markets ilfp(t) (rather than a fixed interest
85.1% is the average target cash rate set by the Reserve Bank of Australia between 2001 and 2011.
9Alternatively, the superannuation account could be converted into a life-long pension with its in-built
insurance against longevity.
10In the empirical analysis, LSs will be derived from official life-table data by age, year and gender.
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rate iret, as they do during retirement). The returns earned in the last years before retire-
ment entry thus alter the disposable income during retirement. Consequently, expected
rates of return in the future change the option value of work today, and thus potentially
alter the timing of retirement entry.
This is where medium-term expectations about the overall state of the economy enter
the retirement decision, as ilfp(t) varies over time. Individuals who decide in t whether
to retire or not, need to form expectations about a sequence of ilfp(s), s=t,...T. In the
absence of directly observed expectations of such future rates of return we need to make
assumptions what such sequences might look like, for different individuals and at different
points in time. This is not straightforward - there is no immediate reason for individu-
als’ expectations to be a precise or unbiased forecast of the true future rates of return,
and in fact their expectations might be not even sensible. Any assumption about those
beliefs is thus necessarily somewhat arbitrary. However, in order to arrive at a plausible
assumption about the expected sequence of future rates of return, we derive different sce-
narios from i) financial information on superannuation funds provided by the Australian
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and ii) the Consumer Attitudes, Sentiments &
Expectations in Australia survey (CASiE). The next section describes the procedure we
use to derive such scenarios of expected rates of return for pessimists and optimists, and
at different points in time.
4 Expectation Scenarios
The model assumes that individuals observe the current rates of return on superannua-
tion in period t, and based on their observation, they form an expectation of the rate of
return during the following twelve months: ilfp(s=t). We assume that in subsequent pe-
riods individuals expect the rate of return on superannuation to converge to its long-term
equilibrium. ilfp(s=t) is high for optimistic individuals and low for pessimistic individuals.
In order to find a plausible ‘starting value’ ilfp(s=t) for the sequence of expected future
rates of return, we divide the entire distribution of observed rates of return on superan-
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nuation funds (RRS), in three classes: (1) the lowest observed rates of return are what
the pessimists assume to determine the medium-term state of the economy, and what
they base their behaviour on; (2) optimists behave as if the highest observed rates of
return determined the economic reality in the upcoming years; (3) a person with neutral
expectations will base his or her behaviour on the middle range of observed rates of return.
The exact size of these classes corresponds to the population shares with optimistic,
pessimistic or neutral expectations. If x% of the population have a pessimistic view on the
economy, the x% lowest rates of return in that year form the class of rates of return that
we assume pessimists expect for the future. Further y% of the population have neutral
expectation; thus the next-highest y% of observed rates of return form the middle class,
which we assume a person with neutral expectations will base the calculation of his or
her option value on. Finally, 100 − x− y% of the population have optimistic views, and
the highest 100− x− y% of realised rates of returns are the class of rates of returns that
are relevant for optimistic individuals. The median rate of return within each of those
three classes is the value for ilfp(s) for that expectation type, which is assigned to all
individuals i in the corresponding expectation type in year s:
ilfp(s = 1) =

px/2(RRS) if i is pessimistic
px+ y/2(RRS) if i is neutral
px+ y + (100− x− y)/2(RRS) if i is optimistic
(5)
The information on rates of returns on superannuation is taken form APRA data,
and the population shares with different expectations stem from CASiE data. APRA is
a statutory authority that oversees the financial services industry, including most super-
annuation funds. They publish financial performance indicators including rates of return
at the fund-level on an annual basis. This fund-level data allows us to see the entire
distribution of rates of return on superannuation RRS, rather than just an average rate.
CASiE is a cross-sectional telephone-survey conducted on a monthly basis. Among ques-
tions on the individual’s own financial situation and intentions to make major purchases,
CASiE also asks respondents about their expectations about the economy as a whole.
Interviewees are asked to make a forecast for the state of the economy on a 5-point scale,
with lower values representing more optimistic views. We define an individual to be op-
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timistic if they answer ‘2’ or ‘1’, to have neutral expectations if they answer ‘3’, and to
be pessimistic if they answer ‘4’ or ‘5’. Table 1 shows the distribution of individuals with
optimistic, pessimistic and medium expectations, which amounts to about one third each
for each year.
The reported population shares are then combined with APRA data that informs us
on the distribution RRS. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the year 2004. In 2004,
33.14 % of the population held a pessimistic view on the future state of the economy,
and 35.09% held an optimistic view. We assume that both groups base their expectations
about the future on past experience, but that the pessimists’ perception of what to expect
for the future is dominated by the worst results achieved in the given year. That means,
each pessimist will base his behaviour on one of the lowest 33.14% of rates of return on
superannuation funds, i.e. the area left from the first vertical line. The optimists’ per-
ception is dominated by the best results achieved in the given year, and they will base
their behaviour on one of the highest 35.09% of rates of return, i.e. the area right of the
second vertical line. The middle section is the range of rates of return which individuals
with neutral expectations deem representative of the future. We use the median rate of
return within each class to represent the whole class. In 2004, pessimists are assumed to
have expected the rate of return on superannuation to be 8.7% in the following year, in-
dividuals with neutral expectations are assumed to have expected it would be 12.0%, and
optimists are assumed to have expected a rate of return of 14.2%. The same procedure
is applied in the following years, leading to the values for ilfp(s = t) by expectation type
and time as they are shown in Table 2.
From this starting point, individuals assume convergence of ilfp(s) towards its long-
term equilibrium:
ilfp(s) = c1 · ilfpbase + c2 · ilfp(s− 1). (6)
We estimate the rate of convergence by regressing the rate of return in a given year on
the rate return in the previous year, using information on average rates of return from
1996 to 2012. This yields ilfp(s) = 0.044 · ilfpbase + 0.232 · ilfp(s−1), implying a long-term
equilibrium of 0.058. The optimist in year 2004 in the above example thus assumes ilfp(s),
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s=t,...,T will be 14.2%, 7.7%, 6.2% and 5.9% before it converges to its equilibrium of 5.8%.
Those rates affect the expected retirement savings in an individual’s superannuation
account, which will affect the expected retirement income once the individual retires; the
expected rates of return thus are a factor that determines each individual’s option value of
further work. In order to map out how strongly their retirement entry behaviour might be
impacted by their optimism or pessimism, we will first estimate the model in equation (1)
to get an estimate of workers’ resposniveness to changes in their option value of work. We
then simulate different option values for each worker, assuming the worker had optimistic
or pessimistic expectations. Based on the behavioural model and the different option
values for different economic expectations, we can then predict hazard rates of retirement
entry for each individual, assuming the individuals had been optimistic or pessimistic.
5 Data and Descriptives
We estimate equation (1) using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics
in Australia study HILDA, an annual household survey conducted since 2001. HILDA
contains all necessary information on individuals’ labour force status, earnings and cur-
rent superannuation wealth that are necessary for the analysis of their retirement entry
behaviour. We restrict the analysis to men aged 55 to 75 between 2004 and 2010,11 who
have been employed at some point in their life, for whom all neccessary information on
income and superannuation savings is available,12 and discard observations after retire-
ment entry has occured. A person is assumed to be retired if he is not working and not
looking for work, and reports the main reason for this to be retirement. This leaves us
with 4,258 observations from 1,123 individuals to estimate men’s responsiveness to their
option value of work in a standard framework; that is, assuming expectations about the
future state of the economy are constant over time and across individuals.
11While average rates of return are available from APRA beginning in 1996, fund-level data is available
only for year 2004 and later. Earlier waves of HILDA thus could not be used for this analysis.
12Information on superannuation is collected in 2002, 2006 and 2010. For the waves in between those
years, we extrapolate the superannuation wealth from reported contribution and the average rate of
return of all superannuation funds in the given year. If we extrapolate the superannuation wealth to a
year when it is included in HILDA again, the extrapolated and reported values correspond reasonably
closely. More detail is given in Appendix A.
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Table 3 shows hazard rates into retirement together with the option value of work
and the retirement wealth by age, each for constant expectations across indivdiuals and
over time at the long-term equilibrium rate of return of 5.8%. An average option value
of 31,109 means that the average individual in our sample expects that, by staying in
the labour force until he reaches his maximum utility stream, he will be able to gain
an additional 31,109 ‘utility units’ compared to his utility from retiring immediately. A
‘utility unit’ is closely related to the discounted present value of $1 additional income at
some point in the future, adjusted for utility from leisure and risk aversion. The average
option value declines sharply with age, and at the same time, the population share with
an option value of zero increases: the older an individual is, the less utility they can gain
from an additional year of work, and the more likely they are to not gain anything at
all.13 Parallel to a decrease in the option value by age, we observe an increase in the
probability of retirement entry.
However, these option values are calculated under the assumptions that everyone at
every point in time assumes to receive 5.8% returns on his superannuation savings until
his death. How does this change when we incorporate the expected sequences of rates
of return as described in Section 4? In order to identify whether the financial incentives
and the corresponding probability of retirement entry vary across individuals with differ-
ent expectations on the economy, we need to identify ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ in our
sample. HILDA does not contain direct information on one’s pessimism or optimism, but
contains socio-demographic information that can be used to predict their level of opti-
mism. This is described in Appendix B. It is important to note that there is no problem
arising from endogneity of one’s expectations, as we do not base our analysis on the ind-
vidual’s observed personal expectation, but on expectations of people who are similar to
him, based on observed characteristics. Table 4 shows socio-demographic characteristics
as well as the average probability of retirement entry, the option value of work OVt and
the retirement wealth Vt for individuals with optimistic, medium or pessimistic views.
Financial incentives are now calculated under the assumptions described in Table 2 and
the path of convergence as described in Section 4.
13At age 74, the option value reaches zero by construction, since we consider 75 to be the last possible
age of retirement entry.
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The descriptive statistics for the three groups of individuals paint a mixed picture. As
expected, the hazard rate of retirement entry for pessimists is, on average, higher than
the hazard rate for those with medium expectations, while their option value of work is
lower. However, optimists have again a higher option value of work, but this is not ac-
companied by a further decrease in the hazard rate. While, as expected, the option value
of work appears to monotonically increase with one’s optimism, that does not appear to
directly translate into a decrease in retirement entry rates. However, differences in the
distribution of other characteristics shed some light on this.
First, the option value of work varies across groups not only because of their expecta-
tions. When we look at the option values of work that members of an expectation group
would have had, had they formed different expectations (their ‘counterfactual’ option val-
ues), we see a monotonically increasing relationship between the option value of work and
one’s optimisim, but this hypothetical increase within each group is much smaller than
the actual observed differences across groups. Optimists differ from pessimists not only
in their option value of work - they are also older and enjoy a higher retirement wealth.
If leisure is a normal good and disutility of labour increases with age, hazard rates of
retirement entry would be higher for pessimists than they are, were they of the same age
and wealth as the optimists.
On the other hand, pessimists are almost twice as likely to be in poor health as the
optimists; twice as likely to not have finished high school, and twice as likely to be renting
a domicile rather than owning their home. All these factors might also contribute to dif-
ferences in pessimists’ and optimists’ hazard rates of retirement entry, regardless of any
possible effects of pessimism and optimism on option values of work, and subsequently
on retirement entry decisions. In the next section, we present how retirement entry rates
differ with the option value if those differences in other observable characteristics are ex-
plicitly controlled for.
15
6 Estimation Results
Estimating equation (1) yields the effect of the option value of work on the hazard rate of
retirement entry. Table 5 shows the coefficients and marginal effects of the option value for
different model specifications. In the column 1, Xit is restricted to three dummy variables
representing the individuals self-reported health; in column 3 the full set of covariates is
included. The coefficient on OVt is negative and highly significant; the higher the option
value of work, the lower the probability that an individual retires within the next year.
This result is in line with the international evidence from numerous different countries
(Samwick (1998), Gruber and Wise (2004)), as well as a recent study by Warren and
Oguzoglu (2010) for Australia.
The average marginal effect across all individuals is -0.012, which means that the haz-
ard rate of retirement entry will drop on average by 1.2 percentage points, if the option
value of work is increased by 10,000 utility units (=about half a standard deviation, see
Table 3). The marginal effect is thus not only highly significant, but also economically
substantial. Columns 2 and 3 present the coefficients and average marginal effects for
two extended versions of the model that also control for education and home ownership,
and for state dummies and a linear time trend. The additional controls have virtually no
effect on neither the coefficient of the option value, nor its marginal effect.
6.1 The impact of expectations
The estimate of the parameters of equation (1) show clearly that greater expected fi-
nancial gains from further work impact on the timing of retirement entry. But by how
much will the option value, and in turn, the probability of retirement entry change, if an
individual adopts a more pessimistic or more optimistic viewpoint on the medium-term
future? For the simulation of the impact of pessimistic or optimistic interpretations of
the current state of the economy, we calculate a ‘pessimistic’ and an ‘optimistic’ option
value for each indivdiual in the sample, based on the rates of return on the retirement
fund market as defined in Section 4. Those counterfactual option values were reported in
Table 4. We then predict hazard rates of retirement entry for both option values of work,
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using the coefficients from the model presented in the last column of Table 5. The first
panel of Table 6 shows the results.
The predicted retirement entry rate if everyone were to adopt an optimistic view on
the medium-term economic future decreases to 8.4%, compared to 8.5% if everyone were
to adopt a pessimistic view. The difference in the hazard rates of entering retirement of
0.1 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1%-level. The behavioural impact
is thus very small. However, it is important to keep in mind that this is a behavioural
response based on nothing but the individual’s view of the world. The past and cur-
rent economic environment, as far as they affect current and past income and savings
streams, are controlled in the model through the individual’s wealth level. The effect of
optimism and pessimism stems purely from the fact that optimists and pessimists deem
different parts of the actually observed reality to be representative of the future. The
behavioural response is not a response to experienced changes in the economic environ-
ment, but purely an effect of the expectations about changes in the economic environment,
regardles of whether those expected changes turn out to be realised later on.
Moreover, optimists as well as pessimists take their expectations from the observed
rates of return within the last twelve months. One group focuses on the best outcomes
that were observed last year, while the other group focuses on the worst outcomes ob-
served last year - but both groups base their future expectations on what has happened
last year, leaving no room for major changes of the overall economy, such as large up-
swings or downturns. Table 2 shows that the variation of rates of return within one year
is much smaller than is the variation of rates of return over time. If we want to simulate
possible responses to expectations of an economic upturn or downturn, using a rate of
return from a ‘bad year’ and a ‘good year’ as starting point ilfp(s = 1) is more appropri-
ate. We calculate option values for a ‘very pessimistic’ scenario, where the option value
is based on a rate of return on superannuation funds of ilfp(s = t) = -22.0% in the next
year, and then converges towards the long-term equlibrium according to the same path as
defined in Section 4; the alternative scenario is ‘very optimistic’, where the rate of return
for the next year is assumed to be ilfp(s = t) = 18.3%.
14
14The value -22.0% was the 5th-percentile of rates of return in 2008, the year when the GFC hit its peak;
the convergence path is -22.%, -0.6%, 4.3%, 5.4% and 5.7% before the equilibrium is reached. Likewise,
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The second panel of Table 6 shows predicted retirement entry rates if the expected
economic circumstances are ‘very pessimistic’ or ‘very optimistic’. Although both shocks
are short, they appear to be sufficient to induce a sizable behavioural response, increas-
ing the average retirement entry rate by 6% from 8.2% to 8.7%. The table also reports
the 10-, 25-, 75-, and 90-percentile as well as the median of the predicted propensity of
entering retirement in any given year. It appears that the effect of optimism versus pes-
simism is greater in absolute terms at the upper end of the distribution, but in relative
terms, the impact of optimism and pessimism is fairly stable across the distribution. At
the 90-%ile of hazard rates of retirement entry, being ‘very optimistic’ instead of ‘very
pessimistic’ decreases the hazard rate by 6%, at the 10-percentile the same effect is 7%.
This is clearly an effect of economic significance. The timing of retirement is a major
life decision; it is commonly seen as almost irreversible and depends on an entire lifetime
of accumulating earnings and savings. If the medium-term economic outlook, even if it
might never be realised, can change the propensity to retire by six to seven per cent, this
has to be considered a major effect.
We then investigate a third scenario: what behavioural response would have resulted,
if individuals had expected the mining boom and the following GFC? The term ilfp now
does not, after one initial shock, converge according to the rate assumed so far, but takes
on the average rates of return on superannuation savings that were observed over the
period of the mining boom and the GFC, respectively. For the ‘mining boom’ scenario,
ilfp takes on the values of the average rate of return between 2003 and 2007 , and the long-
term rate of return of 5.8% immediately thereafter; for the ‘GFC-scenario’, the average
rates of return between 2008 and 2012 are used instead, equally followed by the long-term
equilibrium thereafter.15 The third panel of Table 6 shows the response of retirement
entry behaviour, had individuals expected the swing from the mining boom to the GFC.
On average, such a change in expectations would incur a change in the hazard rate of
retirement entry of 9% or 0.7 percentage points.
18.3% was the 95th-percentile of rates of returns in 2006, the year with the highest returns recorded in
our observation period. The convergence path is: 18.3%, 8.7%, 6.4%, and 5.9%.
15The rates of return on superannuation funds during the mining boom period and the GFC-period
were as follows: 2003: -2.1%; 2004: 12.2%; 2005: 12.2%; 2006: 13.3%; 2007: 14.5%, 2008:-8.1%; 2009:
-11.5%; 2010: 8.9%; 2011:7.8%; 2012: 0.6%.
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Finally, the lowest panel shows the predicted hazard rate of retirement entry for the
‘extreme and inert’ scenario: the assumed rate of return is initially -22% and 18.3% as in
the ‘very pessimistic’ and ‘very optimistic’ scenario. However, this scenario assumes that
individuals see these rates as very inert; instead of expecting the rate of return to converge
to its long-term equilibrium quickly, individuals expect that it will stay as high or as low
for a period of five years. The hazard rate is 28% higher when individuals expect such
a lasting, major crisis than when they expect a lasting, major boom. Now the effect is
stronger at the lower tail of the distribution: at the 10-percentile, optimists are 48% more
likely to retire than optimists are; at the 90-percentile the effect is 22%. However, the
scenario is extreme, and unlikely to occur in such strength in reality, which in turn means
it is not a likely expectation for a majority of reasonable individuals. It is thus to be seen
as an upper bound of the impact of economic expectations on retirement behaviour.
6.2 Heterogeneity in the response to expectations
In the previous section, we have shown that the impact of expecting a boom or a deep
recession on retirement entry is considerable, and appears to vary across the distribution.
The latter fact immediately raises the question which groups are the ones to respond
strongly or not at all. There are generally two possible reasons why one individual’s be-
haviour might be more affected by an expected up-coming boom or recession than another
individual’s behaviour: first, they may differ in how strongly their economic expectations
change their option value of work. We would expect that an individual’s option value
varies the stronger with his expectations, the more superannuation savings he has, given
that the rate of return on superannuation savings is the main mediating factor between
economic expectations and the option value. That is, we expect stronger behavioural
changes for those with high savings when economic expectations change from good to
bad, which are likely to be those with high wages and higher education. Second, two
individuals whose option values are affected identically by their economic expectations,
might still differ in their responsiveness to their option value of work. We would expect
that an individuals’ responsiveness to financial incentives would change with health and
age. Health and age are the two main driving factors of the retirement decision, and the
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importance of financial incentives should decrease when the ’pressure’ to retire increases
because of one’s age or health.
6.2.1 Heterogeneity in the impact of expectations on the option value
To explore the first source of variation in the impact of economic expectations on re-
tirement entry rates, we split the population in groups according to their wages, super-
annuation savings and education. Where Table 6 showed changes in the hazard rate of
retirement entry for different expectations over the full estimation sample, Table 7 shows
the results of the same simulations by sub-groups. As expected, among individuals with
no superannuation savings, whether they are pessimistic or optimistic hardly matters for
their hazard rates of retirement entry. Had individuals without superannuation savings
anticipated the mining boom or the GFC, this anticipation would not have impacted on
their behaviour at all.
Even in the very pessimistic or very optimistic scenarios, individuals with no super-
annuation savings have no reason to change their behaviour: neither do bad economic
conditions threaten to reduce their savings, nor can good economic conditions improve
them. Instead, we find that the average response as reported in Table 7 is caused predom-
inantly by individuals with high superannuation savings: even in the very ”mild” scenario
of individual pessimism or optimism within the range of rates of returns observed in one
given year, individuals with high superannuation savings are 2.2% less likely to retire
when they are optimistic than when they are pessimistic, and when a strong downturn is
expected, individuals’ retirement entry rate decreases by 12.4% if they have high super-
annuation savings.
Expecting a situation such as the world experienced during the GFC, increases retire-
ment entry rates by 17.4% compared to an expected boom as Australia experienced it in
the early 2000s. The most extreme scenario even shows an increase in the hazard rate of
retirement entry of 61.9% for the sub-group with high superannuation savings; however,
as stated before, this scenario is an extreme upper bound.
The same patterm is found when looking at low versus high wage earners and indi-
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viduals with and without a tertiary qualification. Economic expectations matter most
for those at the upper end of the wage distribution, because these individuals have more
savings that can potentially be affected by overall economic conditions, be it positively
or negatively.
6.2.2 Heterogeneity in individual’s responsiveness to the option value
The second possible reason why the importance of economic expectations varies across
the population, is that some individuals will respond more strongly to a change in their
expected income streams than others. We would expect one’s responsiveness to financial
incentives to be the stronger, the less strongly other factors point towards either staying
in or leaving the labour force. In the models presented in Table 5, age and health were
unsurprisingly found to be the strongest predictors of retirement entry.16 Does that mean
that young and healthy individuals also respond more strongly to changes in their expec-
tations of future income streams? To analyse this, we have re-estimated the model from
Table 5, column (3), and added interaction terms between age and the option value, as
well as interaction terms between the health indicators and the option value. The results
from the interacted model suggest that those individuals who are a few years away from
the normal retirement age and in good health respond strongly to their expectations of
future income streams, whereas old or unhealthy individuals are likely to retire regardless
of their financial expectations.17
We would thus expect to see that the 6.0%-change in the average hazard rate of re-
tirement entry when short downturn is expected rather than a short upturn (see Section
6.1), is predominantly driven by a response of healthy workers at an age of a few years
before the normal retirement age. To explore further what role optimism or pessimism
16To illustrate the strength of the effect, Tables 15 and 16 in Appendix C show average predicted
hazard rates of retirement entry across ages and health status groups. The average predicted annual
hazard rate of retirement entry is 8.3%, but if every individual in the sample were in excellent health,
this hazard rate would drop to 6.9%. If everyone were in fair or poor health instead, it would increase
to 14.1% instead. In other words, being in poor health instead of excellent health more than doubles
an individual’s propensity to retire. A very strong effect is also found for age: at age 55, the average
hazard rate of retirement entry is just 3%, but at age 60 it is 8%, and at age 66 it is 15%. Unsurprisingly,
relatively young and healthy individuals are unlikely to retire, while older or sick individuals have a high
propensity to exit the labour force.
17Table 17 in Appendix C shows detailed results.
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plays, given one’s other characteristics, we predict hazard rates of retirement entry for
‘very optimistic’ and ‘very pessimistic’ individuals as in the second panel of Table 6, but
based on the interacted model from Table 17 and for two different types of individuals:
for an individual in excellent health at age 60, and for an individual in poor health at
age 55. Both are expected to have an overall similar retirement entry rate, but different
responsiveness to financial incentives.
Table 8 shows that for a healthy 60-year old hazard rates of retirement entry are
around 8% higher when a downturn is expected, than when an upturn is expected. This
is true at all percentiles of the entire distribution of predicted hazard rates. For the
55-year old in poor health, hazard rates for retirement entry are similar to those for the
healthy 60-year old: the combined effect of being younger and of being less healthy adds
up to about zero, and the propensity to retire is very similar for both groups. However,
the response to future income expectations is less than half as strong at 3.7%: men are
more responsive in their retirement decision to future income expectations in their early
60s than they are at earlier or later ages, and they are also more responsive when they
are in good health. As a result, the less healthy younger individual responds substantially
less to future income than his 60-year-old healthy counterpart, and expectations about
the medium-term economic development matter less.
To summarize, expectations about the future state of the economy have an economi-
cally and statistically significant impact on the timing of retirement, when strong changes
in the overall economic situation such as economic upturns and downturns are considered.
‘Milder’ forms of optimism and pessimism that are based only on variations of rates of
return observed within one year have a statistically significant but economically small
effect on the decision to enter retirement. The effect of economic expectations unsurpris-
ingly fades in comparison to the effect of age and health itself; however, the behavioural
response to optimism and pessimism is not homogenous, and particularly healthy individ-
uals close to the normal retirement age are 7.8% more likely to retire when they expect a
strong downturn than when they expect an upturn.
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7 Conclusion
Using a nationally representative household panel study for Australia (2004-2009), we
identify the role and importance of generally held expectations about economic condi-
tions in the next 5 years in determining the probability of exit from the labour market
into retirement. We carry out a retirement option value analysis, such that economic
expectations factor into the individual’s perceived option value. During the time period
under observation, Australia, along with the rest of the world, experienced substantial
economic turbulence of the Global Financial Crisis. During the time, the top and bottom
5% of the distribution of returns on superannuation funds ranged from 18% (in 2006) to
-22% (in 2008), respectively.
Had people been able to forecast the impending growth slowdown of the GFC, it would
have led to a 8.7% increase in exit rates from employment to retirement. Seen in absolute
terms, this implies increasing the exit rate from 8.1 percentage points to 8.8 percentage
points (+0.7 percentage points). While an individual’s health status and age are main
determinants of entry into retirement, these perceived economic expectations have an ad-
ditional effect in themselves. Those persons exiting the labour market would no longer
be paying tax on labour earnings and superannuation withdrawals are at that point tax-
free. Thus, a government would be expected to forgo substantial tax revenues from this
additional increase in the exiting population. These forgone tax revenues would of course
exacerbate the falling revenues from the overall tax base during the downturn, i.e. the
goods and services value-added tax (GST), corporate tax, tax on earnings, capital gains.
At the same time, the government would experience increased expenditures on welfare,
unemployment insurance and other transfers.
The effects of economic expectations are not uniform over other individual charac-
teristics, such that individuals with high superannuation savings experience the greatest
impact of their economic expectations on their financial incentives to retire, and that those
individuals who are a few years away from the normal retirement age and in good health
have the strongest response to any given change in their financial incentives. In contrast,
the retirement decision of elderly or unhealthy individuals is likely to be irrespective of
their financial expectations, while the financial incentives for individuals with no or little
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savings do not depend on their economic outlook nearly as much. As a result, the effect of
economic expectations on retirement entry behaviour is concentrated among individuals
at the upper end of the earnings distribution. This indicates further that those exiting
into retirement earlier are likely to be those with high earnings (as opposed to merely
average earnings), making the loss in income tax revenue even stronger.
This is the first paper to combine reported forward looking economic expectations
with nationally representative data on retirement and labour market participation. The
expectations are not from the individuals themselves, but generally held by people like
them, strengthening their exogenous nature and the generalisability of the results. These
expectations play an economically and statistically significant role and must be accounted
for in retirement decision models. Given the dynamically changing growth patterns post
GFC, economic expectations are likely to play a more important role, not only in influ-
encing retirement decisions, but also in general economic decision making.
References
APRA (2013). Annual superannuation bulletin: June 2013. revised 5 february 2014.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
Blundell, R., C. Meghir, and S. Smith (2004, October). Pension Incentives and the Pattern
of Retirement in the United Kingdom. In Social Security Programs and Retirement
around the World: Micro-Estimation, NBER Chapters, pp. 643–690. National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
Chan, S. and A. H. Stevens (2001). Job loss and employment patterns of older workers.
Journal of Labor Economics 19 (2), pp. 484–521.
Coile, C. and J. Gruber (2001). Social security incentives for retirement. In Themes in
the Economics of Aging, pp. 311–354. University of Chicago Press.
Coile, C. C. and P. B. Levine (2006). Bulls, bears, and retirement behavior. Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 59 (3), pp. 408–429.
24
Coile, C. C. and P. B. Levine (2011). The market crash and mass layoffs: How the
current economic crisis may affect retirement. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy 11 (1).
Davis, S. J. and T. M. von Wachter (2011). Recessions and the cost of job loss. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gerrans, P., M. Clark-Murphy, and C. Speelman (2010). Asset allocation and age effects
in retirement savings choices. Accounting & Finance 50 (2).
Goda, G. S., J. B. Shoven, and S. N. Slavov (2012). Does Stock Market Performance
Influence Retirement Intentions? Journal of Human Resources 47 (4), 1055–1081.
Gruber, J. and D. A. Wise (2004, September). Social Security Programs and Retirement
around the World: Micro-Estimation. NBER Books. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Hurd, M. D., M. Reti, and S. Rohwedder (2009). The effect of large capital gains or losses
on retirement. In Developments in the Economics of Aging, pp. 127–163. University of
Chicago Press.
OECD (2013). Pensions markets in focus. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development Publishing.
Puri, M. and D. T. Robinson (2007). Optimism and economic choice. Journal of Financial
Economics 86 (1), 71–99.
Samwick, A. A. (1998, November). New evidence on pensions, social security, and the
timing of retirement. Journal of Public Economics 70 (2), 207–236.
Stock, J. H. and D. A. Wise (1990, September). Pensions, the option value of work, and
retirement. Econometrica 58 (5), 1151–80.
Warren, D. and U. Oguzoglu (2010). Retirement in australia: a closer look at the financial
incentives. Australian Economic Review 43 (4), 357–375.
25
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
-
.2 0 .2.087
.12
.142
Rate of return on superannuation
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0064
Figure 1: Distribution of rates of return on superannuation funds (RRS) in 2004
Expectation Type
Year Optimistic Medium Pessimistic Total
2004 % 35.09 31.77 33.14 100.00
2005 % 31.47 27.94 40.60 100.00
2006 % 30.31 27.77 41.93 100.00
2007 % 39.51 28.93 31.57 100.00
2008 % 32.43 30.76 36.81 100.00
2009 % 39.34 33.28 27.38 100.00
2010 % 38.20 33.89 27.90 100.00
Table 1: Observed economic expectations in CASiE - population shares in per cent
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Expectation Type
Year Optimistic Medium Pessimistic Total
2004 0.142 0.120 0.087 0.118
2005 0.141 0.121 0.095 0.118
2006 0.156 0.139 0.113 0.134
2007 0.159 0.135 0.100 0.135
2008 -0.046 -0.085 -0.125 -0.084
2009 -0.059 -0.116 -0.146 -0.096
2010 0.100 0.080 0.039 0.079
Table 2: Rates of return by predicted expectation type and year
Age Hazard Rate Option Value Option Value Option Value=0
(Years) (0 - 1) (Mean) (Std. Dev.) Population share
55 years 0.030 45378 23604 0.000
56 years 0.042 41311 22858 0.000
57 years 0.019 38254 21406 0.004
58 years 0.060 35534 20591 0.002
59 years 0.078 32860 21344 0.003
60 years 0.068 30899 18920 0.003
61 years 0.083 27921 17464 0.006
62 years 0.059 25112 12735 0.011
63 years 0.127 22257 9856 0.004
64 years 0.250 19663 9689 0.011
65 years 0.185 17055 7599 0.022
66 years 0.156 14691 8273 0.011
67 years 0.158 13768 6740 0.013
68 years 0.143 11263 5997 0.063
69 years 0.208 9621 3746 0.063
70 years 0.200 7165 3477 0.067
71 years 0.135 5243 2425 0.054
72 years 0.086 3821 1620 0.057
73 years 0.188 1949 574 0.031
74 years 0.375 0 0 1.000
Total 0.082 31019 21343 0.013
Table 3: Retirement entry and financial incentive by age
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Expectation Type
cons Optimistic Medium Pessimistic Total
Hazard rate 0.085 0.069 0.088 0.082
Option value (if own expectation) 34863.87 32014.25 26381.76 31202.36
Option value (if optimistic) 34863.87 32382.99 26851.77 31463.18
Option value (if neutral) 34395.69 32014.25 26638.86 31108.96
Option value (if pessimistic) 33821.36 31601.97 26381.76 30686.81
Retirement wealth (if own expectation) 42045.86 34467.25 22588.71 33360.43
Retirement wealth (if optimistic) 42045.86 35146.30 23462.05 33843.39
Retirement wealth (if neutral) 41283.39 34467.25 23065.83 33228.14
Retirement wealth (if pessimistic) 40401.48 33727.09 22588.71 32522.55
Age (years) 60.62 59.70 59.44 59.97
Health
Excellent or Very Good 48.40 42.78 38.02 43.35
Good 38.46 40.29 39.74 39.40
Fair or Poor 13.15 16.93 22.24 17.25
Education
Postgraduate 16.43 14.44 7.47 12.85
Bachelor/ Bachelor (Honours) 12.60 13.25 7.20 10.94
Cert III/IV, (Advanced) diplomas 41.63 39.83 33.77 38.47
Year 12, Cert I/II 10.41 7.86 12.94 10.57
Y11 or less 18.93 24.62 38.62 27.17
Home Ownership
Rented 8.09 11.62 17.09 12.12
Owned 88.98 86.50 80.97 85.58
Other/ Don’t know 2.92 1.88 1.94 2.30
State of Residence
NSW 37.37 30.77 21.80 30.27
VIC 16.13 25.81 34.53 25.04
QLD 14.00 21.62 22.91 19.12
SA 7.55 10.00 13.70 10.31
WA 19.35 7.26 4.71 11.06
TAS 3.65 2.31 1.59 2.58
NT 0.37 0.26 0.07 0.23
ACT 1.58 1.97 0.69 1.39
Table 4: Hazard rates, financial incentives and sociodemographic characteristics by eco-
nomic expectations
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(1) (2) (3)
Coefficients -0.175 -0.173 -0.163
(Std. Err.) ( 0.053) ( 0.054) ( 0.053)
Average Marginal Effect -0.013 -0.013 -0.012
(Std. Err.) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)
Control variables
Retirement wealth y y y
Age (linear) y y y
Age (squared) y y y
Health (3 categories) y y y
Education (6 categories) n y y
Home ownership (3 categories) n y y
State of residence (8 states) n n y
Year (linear) n n y
Table 5: The option value and its effect on the hazrad rate of retirement entry: Coefficients
and marginal effect
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Probability of Retirement Entry in percentage points
Expectations: optimistic pessimistic Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 8.368 8.460 0.092 0.030
10-percentile 2.004 2.029 0.025 0.012
25-percentile 3.348 3.386 0.038 0.017
50-percentile 6.274 6.346 0.071 0.033
75-percentile 11.550 11.668 0.119 0.056
90-percentile 17.841 18.030 0.189 0.111
Expectations:
very opti-
mistic
very pes-
simistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 8.177 8.670 0.493 0.162
10-percentile 1.947 2.086 0.139 0.053
25-percentile 3.263 3.477 0.213 0.074
50-percentile 6.126 6.512 0.386 0.131
75-percentile 11.279 11.977 0.698 0.246
90-percentile 17.426 18.480 1.055 0.418
Expectations:
mining
boom
GFC Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 8.044 8.746 0.702 0.227
10-percentile 1.880 2.124 0.244 0.086
25-percentile 3.168 3.531 0.363 0.122
50-percentile 5.976 6.593 0.616 0.200
75-percentile 11.081 12.082 1.002 0.341
90-percentile 17.246 18.592 1.346 0.514
Expectations:
extremely
and inertly
optimistic
extremely
and inertly
pessimistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 7.260 9.285 2.025 0.625
10-percentile 1.578 2.342 0.763 0.255
25-percentile 2.726 3.859 1.133 0.367
50-percentile 5.225 7.121 1.896 0.593
75-percentile 9.917 12.872 2.955 0.915
90-percentile 15.901 19.403 3.503 1.168
Table 6: Predicted hazard rates of retirement entry for different scenarios of economic
expectations
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 repetitions. The bootstrap procedure includes the
estimation of workers’ responsiveness to their option value, but does not account for the random
nature of one’s assigned expectation type.
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Probability of Retirement Entry in percentage points
Expectations: Optimistic Pessimistic Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
No superannuation 12.555 12.555 0.000 0.000
Low superannuation 8.079 8.106 0.027 0.009
High superannuation 7.847 8.020 0.173 0.058
Low wage 10.458 10.522 0.063 0.024
High wage 6.299 6.419 0.120 0.038
No tertiary qualification 8.925 8.994 0.069 0.023
Tertiary qualification 7.361 7.494 0.133 0.045
Expectations:
Very opti-
mistic
Very pes-
simistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
No superannuation 12.554 12.557 0.003 0.002
Low superannuation 8.030 8.177 0.147 0.049
High superannuation 7.481 8.406 0.926 0.307
Low wage 10.330 10.648 0.317 0.117
High wage 6.045 6.712 0.667 0.210
No tertiary qualification 8.784 9.154 0.370 0.125
Tertiary qualification 7.080 7.794 0.714 0.239
Expectations:
Mining
Boom
GFC Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
No superannuation 12.550 12.558 0.008 0.004
Low superannuation 7.954 8.217 0.263 0.086
High superannuation 7.267 8.534 1.267 0.412
Low wage 10.240 10.699 0.459 0.169
High wage 5.870 6.814 0.944 0.288
No tertiary qualification 8.660 9.223 0.563 0.188
Tertiary qualification 6.930 7.884 0.954 0.309
Expectations:
Extremely
and inertly
optimistic
Extremely
and inertly
pessimistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
No superannuation 12.544 12.568 0.024 0.012
Low superannuation 7.683 8.480 0.797 0.260
High superannuation 5.831 9.444 3.613 1.111
Low wage 9.604 10.986 1.382 0.484
High wage 4.939 7.601 2.662 0.774
No tertiary qualification 8.031 9.692 1.661 0.536
Tertiary qualification 5.866 8.548 2.682 0.818
Table 7: Predicted hazard rates of retirement entry for different scenarios of economic
expectations - by sub-groups
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 repetitions. The bootstrap procedure includes the
estimation of workers’ responsiveness to their option value, but does not account for the random
nature of one’s assigned expectation type. Superannuation is defined as ‘low’ or ‘high’ if total
superannuation savings are below or above the median of positive superannuation savings in the
estimation sample. Wages are defined as ‘low’ or ‘high’ if an individual’s annual labour earnings
are below or above the median annual labour earnings in the estimation sample.
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Age 60; Health: Excellent
Expectations:
Very opti-
mistic
Very pes-
simistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 5.968 6.437 0.469 0.229
10-percentile 3.045 3.256 0.210 0.106
25-percentile 4.237 4.499 0.262 0.132
50-percentile 5.734 6.059 0.324 0.152
75-percentile 7.398 7.874 0.475 0.227
90-percentile 9.134 9.988 0.854 0.484
Age 55; Health: Fair/Poor
Expectations:
Very opti-
mistic
Very pes-
simistic
Diff. Std.Err.(Diff)
Mean 5.991 6.211 0.220 0.338
10-percentile 3.439 3.546 0.107 0.146
25-percentile 4.460 4.593 0.133 0.179
50-percentile 5.728 5.893 0.165 0.237
75-percentile 7.190 7.417 0.227 0.364
90-percentile 8.776 9.174 0.398 0.704
Table 8: Predicted hazard rates of retirement entry for different scenarios of economic
expectations - by age and health
32
A Imputation of superannuation wealth
HILDA contains detailed information on households’ wealth, including superannuation
wealth, in waves 2002, 2006 and 2010. In the waves in between, we imputed individuals’
savings in superannuation accounts by extrapolating the most recent observed values.
Alongside the total savings in one’s account in a given wave, HILDA asks respondents
about the total employer contributions they receive, as well as about regular, own vol-
untary contributions; both as a percentage of their salary. Together with information on
individuals’ salaries and average rates of return on superannuation funds are taken from
APRA data, we can extrapolate total superannuation wealth under the assumption that
the contribution rates stay constant and the individual receives an average rate of return.
Table 9 shows imputed superannuation wealth for the sample of men that was used for
the analysis, if positive superannuation wealth was observed in at least one of the waves.
Superannuation Wealth
Mean Std. Dev. 25-percentile Median 75-percentile
Observed Values
2002 188900 252915 25000 100000 250000
Imputed Values
2003 189591 243867 26856 96527 266499
2004 187710 242458 27000 97403 260688
2005 212504 266083 33428 113863 302938
2006 243145 304923 37438 128340 339897
Observed Values
2006 271598 425130 25250 132500 322500
Imputed Values
2007 309930 467428 33990 158620 376265
2008 362704 525528 46702 191496 448730
2009 329881 470022 46496 178831 412076
2010 297142 418616 45369 162637 379837
Observed Values
2010 305146 466962 25000 140000 380000
Table 9: Observed and Imputed Superannuation Wealth
In 2006 and 2010, we can compare the values that were extrapolated from the last wave
with wealth information to the newly observed values in order to test how accurate the ex-
trapolation method is. The men included in our sample reported a mean superannuation
wealth of $189,000 in 2002. The median wealth is substantially lower at $100,000. Four
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years later, we predict superannuation wealth for the same group to have increased to
an average of $243,000 and a median of $128,000. Comparing the extrapolated values to
the observed values in 2006 shows that superannuation wealth has, on average, increased
stronger than the extrapolation suggests, by 11%. The predicted median wealth is very
close to the observed wealth, as is the 75-percentile. However, the extrapolation method
fails to pick up that the lower end of the distribution hardly experiences any increase in
reported superannuation wealth from 2002 to 2006 at all. Overall, the predicted distribu-
tion of superannuation wealth resembles the observed distribution reasonably closely. The
same observation can be made four years later, when comparing superannuation wealth
extrapolated from the information that was available in 2006, to observed superannuation
wealth in 2010. The average extrapolated superannuation wealth is less than 2% smaller
the the observed superannuation wealth, and the median and the 75-percentile are pre-
dicted reasonably well. Again, the extrapolation method does not pick up that the lower
end of reported superannuation wealth is near stagnant between 2002 and 2010. Overall,
imputed superannuation wealth seems to resemble closely the observed superannuation
wealth, except for the lower tail of the distribution. However, the option value of work for
those with very low private savings will be driven mostly by their salary and Age pension
entitlement; whereas the rate of return on private savings will impact the option value of
work mostly for those at the upper end of the superannuation wealth distribution. The
error that extrapolation of superannuation wealth potentially imposes on the behavioural
simulation in this paper, should thus be limited.
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B Estimating the probability of being optimistic or
pessimistic
Since HILDA data does not contain direct information on individuals’ optimism or pes-
simism (see Section 5), we predict their attitude based on their socio-economic character-
istics, and the relationship between those characteristics and one’s optimism or pessimism
as we observe it in CASiE. Besides individual and general economic expectations, CASiE
provides a number of personal characteristics, namely the state of residence, age and gen-
der, occupation and education, household size, income and home ownership. Based on
those characteristics, we estimate ordered probit models (separately for each year, for men
only) to model the expectations on the state of the economy in the future. The same char-
acteristics that can be identified in CASiE can also be identified in HILDA. Combining
the coefficients from the ordered probit models estimated from CASiE, and the individual
characteristics observed in HILDA, we can predict the latent variable describing an indi-
vidual’s continuous optimism or pessimism for each individual in the HILDA population.
We sort individuals according to that latent variable, and assign the expectation type
‘optimist’ to those with the highest and the expectation type ‘pessimist’ to those with the
lowest predicted latent optimism. The expectation types are assigned in such a way that
the observed population shares for optimists and pessimists from CASiE are maintained.18
Table 10 shows the expectation types assigned to each individual in the HILDA sam-
ple. Compared to the population shares observed in CASiE, our sample of men aged 55
to 75 contains more pessimists and more optimists, but fewer individuals with neutral
expectations. However, the differences between the observed population shares in CASiE
and the assigned expectation types in HILDA are small and not systematic.
we assign expectation types to individuals on HILDA based on their personal charac-
teristics, and an ordered probit model of ’economic optimism’ estimated on CASiE data.
The estimation was conducted separately by year, for men only. Table 11 shows the
coefficients and standard errors, as well as some model information.
18Note that in order to match the population the CASiE estimates and population shares are based
on, the predicted latent optimism is estimated for, and the expectation types are assigned to, the entire
HILDA population rather than our sample of men aged 55 to 75.
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Expectation Type
Year Optimistic Medium Pessimistic Total
2004 % 29.00 28.65 42.35 100.00
2005 % 33.57 26.09 40.35 100.00
2006 % 37.34 21.79 40.87 100.00
2007 % 45.20 26.99 27.81 100.00
2008 % 29.19 27.68 43.12 100.00
2009 % 48.06 30.97 20.97 100.00
2010 % 45.64 29.99 24.37 100.00
Table 10: Predicted economic expectations in HILDA - population shares in per cent
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Coeff. (Std.Err.)
Y2004 Y2005 Y2006
exp type
State; Ref.: NSW . . . . . .
VIC 0.070 (0.044) 0.144 (0.043) 0.121 (0.044)
QLD 0.058 (0.047) 0.076 (0.046) 0.016 (0.047)
SA 0.118 (0.052) 0.171 (0.051) 0.071 (0.052)
WA -0.097 (0.050) 0.020 (0.049) -0.205 (0.050)
TAS 0.024 (0.081) 0.231 (0.082) -0.088 (0.081)
ACT 0.090 (0.125) 0.180 (0.122) 0.099 (0.124)
HH income; Ref: <=20k . . . . . .
>20k-30k -0.021 (0.066) 0.031 (0.066) -0.027 (0.065)
>30k-40k 0.022 (0.067) -0.094 (0.067) -0.076 (0.069)
>40k-50k -0.047 (0.071) -0.062 (0.070) -0.084 (0.073)
>50k-60k -0.040 (0.072) -0.119 (0.070) -0.211 (0.073)
>60k-80k -0.097 (0.069) -0.131 (0.067) -0.130 (0.069)
>80k-100k -0.105 (0.075) -0.184 (0.074) -0.199 (0.075)
>100k -0.174 (0.070) -0.256 (0.067) -0.251 (0.069)
Age; Ref: 55-64 years . . . . . .
65 years and older -0.163 (0.052) -0.146 (0.050) -0.109 (0.048)
Occupation; Ref: Managers . . . . . .
Professionals 0.110 (0.050) 0.082 (0.048) 0.057 (0.050)
Tradespersons 0.116 (0.065) 0.033 (0.063) 0.123 (0.067)
Clerks 0.007 (0.103) 0.128 (0.102) 0.129 (0.105)
Salespersons 0.084 (0.074) -0.112 (0.075) 0.040 (0.074)
Machine Operators 0.103 (0.082) 0.139 (0.078) 0.101 (0.078)
Labourers 0.188 (0.067) 0.111 (0.068) 0.077 (0.072)
Out of the Labour Force 0.029 (0.059) -0.000 (0.056) 0.005 (0.056)
Education; Ref <=Year 11 . . . . . .
Full secondary 0.020 (0.046) 0.022 (0.046) -0.007 (0.047)
Certificate, non-trade 0.164 (0.124) 0.081 (0.119) -0.070 (0.101)
Certificate, trade -0.082 (0.056) -0.026 (0.055) -0.056 (0.055)
(Under-)graduate degree 0.020 (0.045) 0.037 (0.044) 0.014 (0.045)
Psotgraduate Degree -0.013 (0.066) -0.004 (0.063) 0.017 (0.062)
Home ownership; Ref: Rented . . . . . .
Owned 0.054 (0.040) -0.011 (0.040) -0.018 (0.045)
Other 0.066 (0.102) -0.050 (0.102) -0.080 (0.108)
HH size; Ref: 1 person . . . . . .
2 persons 0.004 (0.045) 0.021 (0.044) 0.009 (0.044)
3 persons -0.017 (0.054) 0.102 (0.054) -0.009 (0.055)
4 persons -0.053 (0.055) 0.063 (0.054) 0.073 (0.056)
5 persons -0.120 (0.068) 0.008 (0.068) -0.035 (0.072)
6 persons 0.110 (0.111) 0.072 (0.108) -0.039 (0.125)
7 persons and more -0.214 (0.165) -0.061 (0.153) 0.136 (0.144)
Observations 5638 5870 5727
Log lik. -6104.216 -6312.349 -6114.188
Chi-squared 72.363 83.542 90.254
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 11: Ordered probit estimation of the probability of being optimistic or pessimistic
by year, 2004-2006
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Coeff. (Std.Err.)
Y2007 Y2008
exp type
State; Ref.: NSW . . . .
VIC 0.092 (0.044) 0.082 (0.041)
QLD 0.060 (0.048) -0.006 (0.046)
SA 0.010 (0.052) 0.116 (0.050)
WA -0.184 (0.050) 0.051 (0.050)
TAS -0.053 (0.083) -0.134 (0.075)
ACT 0.020 (0.122) 0.075 (0.113)
HH income; Ref: <=20k . . . .
>20k-30k -0.047 (0.065) -0.068 (0.064)
>30k-40k -0.058 (0.069) -0.024 (0.069)
>40k-50k -0.117 (0.072) -0.115 (0.071)
>50k-60k -0.114 (0.076) -0.003 (0.072)
>60k-80k -0.125 (0.070) -0.092 (0.069)
>80k-100k -0.163 (0.077) -0.135 (0.072)
>100k -0.199 (0.069) -0.140 (0.065)
Age; Ref: 55-64 years . . . .
65 years and older -0.199 (0.046) -0.028 (0.044)
Occupation; Ref: Managers . . . .
Professionals 0.064 (0.052) 0.008 (0.047)
Tradespersons 0.041 (0.070) 0.044 (0.066)
Clerks 0.058 (0.106) -0.058 (0.111)
Salespersons -0.054 (0.077) -0.103 (0.076)
Machine Operators 0.068 (0.082) 0.104 (0.082)
Labourers 0.113 (0.077) 0.107 (0.069)
Out of the Labour Force 0.082 (0.056) -0.087 (0.051)
Education; Ref <=Year 11 . . . .
Full secondary -0.035 (0.049) -0.032 (0.047)
Certificate, non-trade 0.144 (0.092) -0.075 (0.092)
Certificate, trade 0.047 (0.055) -0.118 (0.052)
(Under-)graduate degree -0.003 (0.046) -0.122 (0.044)
Psotgraduate Degree 0.032 (0.062) -0.033 (0.059)
Home ownership; Ref: Rented . . . .
Owned -0.077 (0.046) -0.014 (0.042)
Other -0.100 (0.108) 0.019 (0.120)
HH size; Ref: 1 person . . . .
2 persons -0.014 (0.045) -0.039 (0.043)
3 persons 0.022 (0.056) 0.001 (0.055)
4 persons 0.001 (0.057) -0.047 (0.055)
5 persons -0.086 (0.070) -0.037 (0.070)
6 persons 0.163 (0.126) -0.138 (0.110)
7 persons and more 0.268 (0.178) -0.078 (0.168)
Observations 5676 6073
Log lik. -6009.481 -6596.055
Chi-squared 90.128 62.654
p-value 0.000 0.002
Table 12: Ordered probit estimation of the probability of being optimistic or pessimistic
by year, 2007-2008
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Coeff. (Std.Err.)
Y2009 Y2010
exp type
State; Ref.: NSW . . . .
VIC 0.011 (0.044) -0.014 (0.040)
QLD -0.014 (0.050) 0.114 (0.045)
SA 0.020 (0.054) -0.008 (0.050)
WA -0.099 (0.054) -0.021 (0.049)
TAS -0.191 (0.083) -0.058 (0.073)
ACT 0.047 (0.127) 0.047 (0.113)
HH income; Ref: <=20k . . . .
>20k-30k 0.058 (0.070) -0.160 (0.066)
>30k-40k -0.151 (0.077) -0.188 (0.072)
>40k-50k 0.010 (0.076) -0.070 (0.071)
>50k-60k -0.101 (0.079) -0.161 (0.073)
>60k-80k -0.115 (0.075) -0.250 (0.070)
>80k-100k -0.157 (0.081) -0.160 (0.074)
>100k -0.155 (0.073) -0.291 (0.068)
Age; Ref: 55-64 years . . . .
65 years and older -0.146 (0.047) -0.071 (0.042)
Occupation; Ref: Managers . . . .
Professionals -0.023 (0.053) 0.071 (0.049)
Tradespersons -0.068 (0.073) 0.049 (0.066)
Clerks -0.112 (0.123) -0.069 (0.120)
Salespersons -0.217 (0.085) 0.099 (0.076)
Machine Operators -0.117 (0.090) 0.084 (0.085)
Labourers 0.036 (0.081) -0.064 (0.075)
Out of the Labour Force -0.073 (0.057) -0.017 (0.053)
Education; Ref <=Year 11 . . . .
Full secondary -0.110 (0.054) -0.076 (0.048)
Certificate, non-trade 0.046 (0.096) -0.052 (0.094)
Certificate, trade -0.051 (0.056) -0.016 (0.052)
(Under-)graduate degree -0.105 (0.048) -0.108 (0.043)
Psotgraduate Degree -0.145 (0.064) -0.178 (0.059)
Home ownership; Ref: Rented . . . .
Owned -0.054 (0.047) -0.017 (0.042)
Other -0.125 (0.198) -0.293 (0.210)
HH size; Ref: 1 person . . . .
2 persons -0.000 (0.048) 0.030 (0.044)
3 persons 0.037 (0.059) 0.039 (0.055)
4 persons -0.019 (0.060) 0.009 (0.056)
5 persons -0.046 (0.077) 0.025 (0.070)
6 persons 0.176 (0.138) 0.043 (0.114)
7 persons and more -0.071 (0.189) 0.319 (0.166)
Observations 5292 6276
Log lik. -5506.321 -6645.056
Chi-squared 65.583 79.807
p-value 0.001 0.000
Table 13: Ordered probit estimation of the probability of being optimistic or pessimistic
by year, 2009-2010
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While some of the characteristics that determine one’s predicted level of optimism have
little change over time (such as occupation and education), others vary more strongly (for
example age and household income), as do the models’ coefficients. As a result, the same
individual might be estimated to be optimistic in one year, and pessimistic in another.
Table 14 shows how frequently individuals adopt a type of expectations that differs from
their expectations last year.
Last Year: Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic
This Year: Neutral Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Neutral Total
2005 0.066 0.047 0.101 0.092 0.057 0.103 0.466
2006 0.069 0.038 0.074 0.091 0.059 0.074 0.405
2007 0.061 0.033 0.096 0.045 0.076 0.126 0.437
2008 0.117 0.129 0.072 0.128 0.037 0.065 0.549
2009 0.060 0.021 0.124 0.037 0.140 0.132 0.515
2010 0.115 0.078 0.131 0.061 0.056 0.064 0.505
Table 14: Population share who changes expectation type compared to previous year
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C The impact of age and health on retirement entry
Tables 15 and 16 show average predicted hazard rates of retirement entry at different ages
and for different health situations.
Probability of Retirement Entry
Health Status Absolute probability Relative to Baseline
Observed Health 0.084 1.000
Excellent/Very Good 0.069 0.822
Good 0.074 0.890
Fair/Poor 0.141 1.682
Table 15: Prediction - by Health Status
Probability of Retirement Entry
Age Absolute probability Relative to Baseline
Observed Age 0.084 1.000
55 0.031 0.366
57 0.047 0.568
60 0.080 0.960
63 0.116 1.392
66 0.147 1.754
69 0.162 1.944
72 0.160 1.910
75 0.139 1.661
Table 16: Prediction - by Age
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Table 17 shows the marginal effect of the option value of work on the hazard rate of
retirement entry, based on model (3) in table 5 with additional interaction terms (the
option value is interacted with age, age squared and the health situation). Marginal
effects are reported as average effect across the population, as well as for different ages
and health situations.
Marginal effects
(Std. Err.)
Overall effects in interacted model -0.009
( 0.005)
Marginal Effects at age ... Marginal Effects at health ...
55 -0.005 Excellent -0.009
( 0.003) ( 0.006)
57 -0.008 Good -0.010
( 0.003) ( 0.006)
60 -0.011 Fair/Poor -0.006
( 0.004) ( 0.011)
63 -0.013
( 0.008)
66 -0.012
( 0.014)
69 -0.007
( 0.029)
72 0.001
( 0.056)
75 0.012
( 0.095)
Table 17: Marginal effect of the option value by age and health
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